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Analysis of Human Factors 




University of Manchester, UK
Two kinds of bad event
• Individual accidents: high frequency/low 
severity events—slips, trips, falls, bangs and 
knocks usually resulting in a few days 
absence from work (lost time injuries). 
• Organizational accidents: low 
frequency/high severity events—explosions, 
collisions, collapses, releases of toxic 
substances, etc. Is system vulnerability 
adequately assessed by LTIs?  NO!
Two ways of looking at human 
factors problems
• The PERSON approach
• The SYSTEM approach
Individual & organizational ax
have different causal sets
Individual
accidents OrgAx










Poor safety culture 
Commercial pressures




Other holes due to
latent conditions
(resident ‘pathogens’)
Successive layers of defences, barriers, & safeguards
Hazards
Losses








































































• Mistaken compliance (mispliance)
• Malicious compliance (malpliance)







































• What defenses failed (mode/function)?
• How did each defense fail? 
• Were there contributing unsafe acts?
• Workplace factors for each unsafe act?
• Organizational factors (latent conditions) 
contributing to defensive failures and 
workplace factors?
System contributions







Aims of HF event analysis
• Identify recurrent error traps
• Identify how and why defenses fail
• Identify upstream ‘pathogens’
• Rectify systemic weaknesses
TAKE HOME MESSAGE: YOU CAN’T CHANGE
THE HUMAN CONDITION, BUT YOU CAN
CHANGE WORKING CONDITIONS.
